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Change/Highlight Section  
 
This is a living document subject to ongoing improvement. Feedback or suggestions for improvement from 
registered Select Agent entities or the public are welcomed. Please submit comments directly to the 
Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) at: 
CDC: LRSAT@cdc.gov  
APHIS: AgSAS@aphis.usda.gov  
Revision History: 
October 12, 2012: Initial posting 
July 5, 2013 (Revision 1): The revisions are primarily changes to correct editorial errors from previous 
version. 




Section 12(d) of the select agent regulations (42 CFR §73.12, 7 CFR §331.12, and 9 CFR §121.12) requires 
that individuals with access to Tier 1 biological select agents and toxins (Tier 1 BSAT) must be enrolled in an 
Occupational Health Program (OHP). This requirement is intended to ensure the availability of professional 
medical evaluations and treatment. 
The guidance provided in this document is intended to assist entities develop and implement an OHP to 
protect workers with access to Tier 1 BSAT. Entities should develop and implement OHPs that address the 
site-specific health hazards identified by each institution’s assessments, based on the individual 
circumstances of each entity. Entities should also include provisions in their plans that address other 
recognized occupational health risks not specifically related to Tier 1 BSAT (e.g., hearing protection and 
chemical hygiene). There will be differences in the scope and complexity of OHPs developed by different 
organizations due to the individual circumstances at each entity. 
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OHP Requirements 
 
A successful occupational health program is designed to reduce the risk of infection and complications in 
employees with access to Tier 1 BSAT in the event of exposure. Employees with access to Tier 1 BSAT 
should be introduced to the OHP before being granted access to such select agents and toxins. The key 
elements of an effective OHP include: 
• Risk assessment  
• Medical assessment and surveillance 
• Access to clinical health services and management 
• Hazard communication 
Though the RO is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the requirements for an OHP are met, the OHP is 
a living document that should undergo regular review by subject matter experts for updates to ensure that 
it is effective in preventing infection and reducing complications due to exposure to Tier 1 BSAT. Many 
elements of an OHP may already exist in the biosafety, security, and incident response plans. While 
regulation does not require that the OHP is consolidated into one document, FSAP recommends doing so to 
ensure ease of comprehension and training for laboratory workers.  
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Risk Assessment 
Consider the inherent risk of the select agent or toxin in question and the conditions of the laboratory. This 
type of risk assessment may be performed as a part of the biosafety plan. Perform a risk assessment based 
on the following criteria: 
• Route of exposure 
• Incubation period 
• Infectious dose 
• Agent virulence 
• Environmental stability 
• Communicability of the select agent or toxin 
• Genetic modification 
• Inherent risk 
• Available resources for pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis 
• Available vaccine options 
• Use of personal protective equipment 
• Biocontainment issues 
 
Use the information identified in the risk assessment as a guide for the selection of appropriate medical 
preventions and countermeasures. The risk assessment should specifically identify: 
 
• Hazardous characteristics of a known infectious or potentially infectious agent or material 
• Activities that can result in a person’s exposure to an agent 
• Likelihood that such exposure will cause a laboratory acquired infection (LAI) 
• Probable consequences of such an infection 
 
An entity with Tier 1 BSAT should consider providing workers with access to Tier 1 BSAT a card that lists: 
• All select agents and toxins that he/she works with 
• Emergency phone numbers for: 
o Personal contacts 
o Primary care physicians 
o Occupational health physicians 
o Preferred or designated hospital 
o Entity’s Responsible Official 
This information may be necessary when no occupational support is available (e.g., a trip to the emergency 
room). 
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Tier 1 BSAT Precautions 
There are several types of precautions that may need to be taken based on the complexity and the type of 
agents at the in the registered area.  Respiratory Protection 
Entities should develop and implement a respiratory protection program for workers with access to Tier 1 
BSAT. Visitor Policy 
Entities should have policies and provisions in place for at-risk visitors to provide access to their 
occupational health service on a risk-based approach. 
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Medical Assessment and Surveillance 
Workers who may be exposed to a Tier 1 BSAT should receive a thorough medical evaluation prior to 
initiation of work or contact with these agents. In order to determine an individual’s medical fitness to 
perform the duties of a specific position, the healthcare provider should review each employee’s: 
• Previous and ongoing medical problems 
• Current medications 
• Allergies 
• Prior immunizations 
• Necessary medical services to permit the individual to safely assume the duties of the position 
Establish criteria for fitness for duty based on the occupational health hazards identified from the site-
specific comprehensive risk assessment. 
Healthcare providers should be aware of potential hazards via a written description of the potential health 
hazards present in the work environment. 
Periodic medical evaluations targeted to job requirements may be appropriate for workers with substantial 
risk of exposure to infectious agents or other circumstances such as clearance for respirator use or work in 
a pressurized suit. 
Medical support for occupational illnesses should also be provided for workers with access to Tier 1 BSAT. 
Workers should be encouraged to seek medical evaluation for symptoms that they suspect may be related 
to infectious agents in their work area. A high index of suspicion for potential occupational exposures 
should be maintained during any unexplained illness among workers or visitors to worksites containing Tier 
1 BSAT. The healthcare provider should have a working understanding of the biohazards present in the 
workplace and remain alert for evidence of infection and atypical presentations. All exposures to Tier 1 
BSAT should be reported to the medical support services provider. Strategies for responding to biohazard 
exposures should be formulated in advance. Emergency Examinations 
Prompt medical evaluation may be necessary in instances including: 
• All potential exposures, including both direct exposures and proximity exposures 
• Potential human disease 
• When there is a potential impact on public health and safety 
The plan should cover contingencies during work and after hours. OHPs should contain measures for 
infection control. Post-Exposure Medical Surveillance 
Proper post-exposure response is facilitated by exposure-specific protocols that define: 
• Appropriate first aid 
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• Potential post-exposure prophylaxis options 
• Recommended diagnostic tests 
• Sources of expert medical evaluation 
These protocols should address how exposures or reports of potential LAIs that occur at work outside of 
regular work hours are handled and these protocols should be distributed to potential healthcare providers 
(e.g., local hospital emergency departments). 
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Post Exposure Management Risk Assessment after Exposure 
Conduct a risk assessment after potential occupational exposures to any Tier 1 BSAT. Assessment of the 
potential exposure risk should cover the following circumstances: 
• All breaches in the established safety practices while working with Tier 1 BSAT 
• All injuries incurred inside laboratory when handling Tier 1 BSAT 
• Unexplained acute illness or febrile disease in a Tier 1 BSAT worker 
• All incidents covered under section 19(b) of the section agent regulations including: 
o Occupational exposures 
o Release of a select agent or toxin outside of the primary containment barriers 
For additional information, please see the FSAP guidance for reporting theft, loss, or release (Form 3). 
The exposure risk assessment should identify all potentially exposed individuals. Consider the following 
factors when assessing exposure risk after an incident: 
• Agent or toxin information 
• The nature of the mishap and associated circumstances 
• The specific personal protective equipment worn at the time of the incident 
• First aid procedures performed in response to the incident 
• Personal health issues that may make an individual more susceptible to infection Enhanced OHP Elements 
For personnel working with Ebola virus, Marburg virus, Variola major virus, Variola minor virus, and Yersinia 
pestis, isolation provisions and protocols must be considered for inclusion in the OHP. 
These agents may be relatively easy to transmit from person-to-person and therefore may pose a 
significant public health risk. To limit the potential exposure of the general public, consider isolation of 
patients with confirmed or suspected illness caused by these agents. Policies for Agents without Treatment Options 
Since there is no pre- or post-exposure prophylaxis, nor well established treatment options at the present 
time available for several of the Tier 1 BSAT, entities in possession of these agents should develop plans for 
providing post exposure care and support for workers. 
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Hazard Communication 
All personnel approved for access to Tier 1 BSAT should be provided with the following information: 
• The risk and health hazards associated working with the Tier 1 BSAT 
• Typical signs and symptoms of the diseases associated with the select agent or toxin with which 
they work 
• The available pre- and post-exposure resources for treatment 
• Whom to contact and what to do in an emergency 
• Policies for immediately reporting and documenting all potential occupational exposures 
The Responsible Official is required by federal regulation to immediately notify the Federal Select Agent 
Program regarding all occupational exposures to Tier 1 BSAT by telephone, facsimile, or e-mail 
(form3@cdc.gov) or (AgSAS@aphis.usda.gov), and submit a completed APHIS/CDC Form 3 (Report of Theft, 
Loss, or Release of Select Agents and Toxins) within seven calendar days. Reporting and Analyzing Occupational Exposure 
Evaluate all potential occupational exposures to identify factors that contributed to the incident. Identify 
and document all corrective actions taken to mitigate the risk of recurrence. Records Management and Retention 
Maintain all Tier 1 BSAT personnel occupational health related documents and records including copies of 
the Form 3 for at least three years. 
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Vaccine Information 
Commercial vaccines should be made available to workers to provide protection against infectious agents 
to which they may be occupationally exposed. Provide current, applicable vaccine information statements 
whenever a vaccine is administered. Each worker’s immunization history should be evaluated for 
completeness and currency at the time of employment and re-evaluated when the individual is assigned 
job responsibilities with a new biohazard. 
At present time, the following vaccines are available for Tier 1 BSAT: 
• Francisella tularensis 
• Variola major virus  
• Variola minor virus 
• Bacillus anthracis 
The vaccines for smallpox (vaccinia vaccine) and anthrax are FDA licensed. The vaccines for tularemia are 
available through U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigational new drug (IND) protocols. 
Immunization with IND vaccines should be optional. If indicated by risk assessment, the IND vaccines may 
be made available on a voluntary basis under FDA research protocols with informed consent. 
The Anthrax vaccine is recommended by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) 
Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices (ACIP) for groups at risk for repeated exposures to B. 
anthracis spores.  Five groups at risk for repeated exposure include: 
• Laboratory personnel handling environmental specimens (especially powders) and performing 
confirmatory testing for B. anthracis in the U.S. Laboratory Response Network (LRN). 
• Workers who will be making repeated entries into known B. anthracis-spore-contaminated areas. 
• Workers in other settings in which repeated exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores might 
occur. 
Laboratory workers using standard Biosafety Level 2 practices in the routine processing of clinical samples 
or environmental swabs are not considered by ACIP to be at increased risk for exposure to B. anthracis 
spores. (For persons not at risk for repeated exposures to aerosolized B. anthracis spores through their 
occupation, pre-exposure vaccination against anthrax is not recommended). 
Currently no vaccine is available for immunization of laboratory personnel working with botulinum toxin or 
cultures of botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium. Although administered under an FDA 
IND since 1965, CDC discontinued distribution of the Pentavalent (ABCDE) Botulinum Toxoid vaccine in 
2011 due to decline in potency and CDC observed increase in moderate local reactions. An equine-based 
heptavalent (A, B, C, D, E, F, and G) antitoxin is available through a CDC-sponsored FDA IND for treatment of 
individuals with symptoms consistent with botulism. Health-care providers for exposed laboratory 
personnel should consult their state health department epidemiologist to determine if use of HBAT is 
warranted. 
When occupational exposure to highly pathogenic agents is possible and no commercial vaccine is 
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available, it may be appropriate to immunize workers using vaccines or immune serum preparations that 
are investigational, or for which the specific indication constitutes an off-label use. Use of investigational 
products, or of licensed products for off-label indications must be accompanied by adequate informed 
consent outlining the limited availability of information on safety and efficacy. Use of investigational 
products should occur through IND protocols providing safety oversight by both the FDA and appropriate 
institutional human subjects research protection committees. Recommendation of investigational 
products, as well as commercial vaccines that are less efficacious, associated with high rates of local or 
systemic reactions, or that produce increasingly severe reactions with repeated use, should be considered 
carefully. 
The healthcare provider should design medical support services in consultation with representatives from 
the entity’s institutional environmental health and safety program and the principal investigators. Workers 
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Appendix 1: List of Tier 1 BSAT 
Agents Disease Category Recommended Biosafety 
Level2 
Ebola virus  Ebola hemorrhagic fever  HHS  4  
Francisella tularensis  Tularemia  HHS  2 or 3  
Marburg virus  Marburg hemorrhagic fever  HHS  4  
Variola major virus  Smallpox  HHS  4  
Variola minor virus  Smallpox  HHS  4  
Yersinia pestis  Plague  HHS  2 or 3  
Botulinum neurotoxin  Botulism  HHS  2  
Botulinum neurotoxin 
producing species of 
Clostridium  
Botulism  HHS  2  
Bacillus anthracis  Anthrax  Overlap  2 or 3  
Burkholderia mallei  Glanders  Overlap  2 or 3  
Burkholderia 
pseudomallei  
Melioidosis  Overlap  2 or 3  
Foot and Mouth Disease 
virus  
FMDV  USDA  3  
Rinderpest virus  Cattle plague  USDA  3 
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Appendix 2: Minimum Requirements for an Occupational Health Program 
for Tier 1 BSAT 
 
Agents Minimum Requirements 
Ebola virus  Pre-placement Examinations  
Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Isolation Protocols  
Francisella tularensis  Pre-placement Examinations  
Risk-based Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Marburg virus  Pre-placement Examinations  
Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Isolation Protocols  
Variola major virus  Pre-placement Examinations  
Vaccinia immunization  
Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Isolation Protocols  
Variola minor virus  Pre-placement Examinations  
Vaccinia immunization  
Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Isolation Protocols  
Yersinia pestis  Pre-placement Examinations  
Risk-based Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Botulinum neurotoxin  Pre-placement Examinations  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of 
Clostridium  
Pre-placement Examinations  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Bacillus anthracis  Pre-placement Examinations  
Risk-based anthrax vaccine  
Risk-based Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
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Burkholderia mallei  Pre-placement Examinations  
Risk-based Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management 
Agents  Minimum Requirements (1,2,6)  
Burkholderia pseudomallei  Pre-placement Examinations  
Risk-based Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Foot and Mouth Disease virus  Pre-placement Examinations  
Risk-based Respiratory Protection Program  
Emergency Medical Evaluation  
Post-exposure Management  
Rinderpest virus  Pre-placement Examinations  
Risk-based Respiratory Protection Program  
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Appendix 3: Vaccine Resources for Tier 1 BSAT 
Agent  Disease  Availability of 
vaccine  
Type of vaccine  Source  
Ebola virus  Ebola hemorrhagic 
fever  
NA  NA  NA  
Francisella 
tularensis  
Tularemia  IND  Live attenuated 
bacteria vaccine  
USAMRIIDa  
Marburg virus  Marburg 
hemorrhagic fever  
NA  NA  NA  
Variola major 
virus/ Variola 
minor virus  
Smallpox  FDA licensed4  Live vaccine virus  CDCb  





producing species of 
Clostridium  
Botulism  NA  NA  NAc  
Bacillus anthracis  Anthrax  FDA licensed5  Inactivated  Commercially 
available  
Burkholderia mallei  Glanders  NA  NA  NA  
Burkholderia 
pseudomallei  
Melioidosis  NA  NA  NA  
 
Notes:  
• IND – the vaccine is available under an Investigational New Drug protocol and is available for 
limited use.  
• NA – not available.  
• USAMRIID – The United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases 
(USAMRIID).  
• Tularemia vaccine is available through USAMRIID special immunization program.  
• Smallpox Vaccine: CDC is the only source of vaccinia vaccine and VIG for civilians. Vaccine will be 
shipped to the responsible physician. Requests for vaccine and VIG, including the reason for the 
request, should be referred to:  
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
Drug Services, National Center for Infectious Diseases  
Mailstop D-09  
Atlanta, GA 30333  
Telephone: (404) 639-3670  
Facsimile: (404) 639-3717  
 
• In 2011, CDC discontinued the distribution of Pentavalent (ABCDE) Botulinum Toxoid vaccine which 
was available under a CDC-sponsored FDA IND since 1965.  
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